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Helium Conservation: A Policy Matter Not To Be
Taken Lightly
Edward Gerjuoy*
INTRODUCTION: HELIUM USES
It is probable that few members of the legal community are aware
of the Helium Act Amendments of 1960' which authorize the Secre-
tary of the Interior to purchase and store helium extracted from
natural gas. Nevertheless, many of this nation's most prominent
physical scientists believe the United States' long range energy
prospects and concomitant economic well-being may hinge upon
continued implementation of the Act's provisions for helium pur-
chase and storage. These provisions, however, have been suspended
since 1973. Arguing that a vital natural resource is being wasted,
several of the country's most prestigious scientific societies have
vigorously criticized the administration for failing to reinstate the
helium purchase and storage program. The program has given rise
to numerous lawsuits, with noteworthy environmental overtones.
This article will amplify legal, social, and economic implications of
the helium purchase and storage program.2
* The author teaches physics at the University of Pittsburgh, and is a consultant to the
EPA and law firms. He received his Ph.D. in physics from the University of California in 1942,
and his J.D. degree from the University of Pittsburgh in 1977.
1. Pub. L. No. 86-777 § 2, 74 Stat. 918, 50 U.S.C. § 167-167n. (1970).
2. The history of helium production and conservation in the United States, including the
government's initial rationale for passage of the 1960 Helium Act Amendments and its later
reasons for suspending helium purchases, has been described in numerous publications. See,
e.g., Anderson, Who Pays Is Key to Helium's Future, CHEM. & ENG. NEws 11 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Anderson]; Environmental Impact Statement, Bureau of Mines, U.S.
Department of Interior, Termination of Helium Purchase Contracts (1972); S. REP. No. 1814
to Accompany Helium Act Amendments of 1960, reprinted in [19601 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3595.
Comprehensive surveys of the helium controversy are contained in two recent reports:
Interagency Helium Study, Future Helium Requirements and Options for Supplying Pro-
jected Demand, H.R. Doc. No. 7636, 95th Cong. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Interagency
Helium Study]; National Academy of Sciences, Helium: A Public Policy Problem app. I
(The National Resource Council ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Helium Study Committee].
In addition, there are a number of court opinions which present the history and current
status of the helium controversy, including explanations of the existing and potential uses of
helium. See, e.g., Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.), cert.
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Helium is the lightest chemically non-reactive gas; hydrogen, the
only lighter gas, is reactive-often explosively. Therefore, helium is
preferred in applications such as dirigibles and meteorological bal-
loons which specifically require a low weight. Helium also is used
in anesthesia, deep diving, and in a variety of circumstances where
undesirable reactive gases must be excluded. However, the major
reason for regarding helium conservation as an important national
policy issue stems from another property of helium, namely, that
helium remains a gas at lower temperatures than any other sub-
stance.'
The unique low temperature properties of helium are of great
intrinsic scientific interest, and several Nobel Prizes have been
awarded for liquid helium research.4 Continued interest in helium
conservation is based not solely on the possibility of gaining new
insights into the fundamental laws of physics, but also more imme-
diately on established discoveries concerning the remarkable
"superconducting" 5 properties of many substances at low tempera-
tures. Superconductors could make possible the use of electrical
energy much more efficiently than present technologies permit.'
Superconductors also may be indispensable components of con-
trolled thermonuclear fusion reactors, and important elements in
denied, 404 U.S. 951, 1063 (1971); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78 (D.C.
Kan. 1973).
3. For example, at atmospheric pressure helium liquefies at about -452 degrees Fahrenheit
or -269 degrees Centigrade, which is only about 4 Centigrade degrees above absolute zero, The
next lowest liquefaction temperature is hydrogen's at -253 degrees Centigrade, about 16
Centigrade degrees higher than helium's. Moreover, helium will remain liquid (will not
freeze), at the lowest temperatures which have been reached.
4. The 1913 and 1962 Nobel Prizes in physics were awarded for liquid helium research.
See Nobel Lectures Physics 1901-1921 at 301 (1967) and Nobel Lectures Physics 1942-1962
at 605 (1964). For a moderately non-technical discussion of the properties of liquid helium
see E. Lifschitz, Superfluidity, 198 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 30 (June 1958).
5. Superconductivity is a topic of great scientific interest offering new insights into funda-
mental physical laws. A superconductor is capable of carrying electrical currents without
dissipating any of the electrical energy in the wasteful heat losses always accompanying
electric current conduction in ordinary conductors. For a non-technical discussion of super-
conductivity and related phenomena, see Matthias, Superconductivity, 197 SCIENTIFC
AMERICAN 92 (November 1957); Geballe, New Superconductors, 225 SCIEsNTIFIC AMERICAN 22
(November 1971).
6. See, e.g., Superconducting Motors for U.S. Navy, 7 PHYSICS IN TECHNOLOGY 274 (1976).
Non-technical discussions of the use of stiperconductors in transmission lines are given by
Snowden, Superconductors for Power Transmission, 226 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 84 (April 1972),
and by Harimond, Metz, and Maugh, Energy and the Future, 101-108 (Amer. Ass'n. for
Advancement of Science 1973).
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the continued development of transportation systems and comput-
ers.7
For almost all materials, superconductivity can be attained only
by cooling to temperatures well below the liquefaction temperature
of hydrogen. Once a gas liquefies, a further reduction in its tempera-
ture is vastly more difficult. Thus, liquid helium is the indispensa-
ble coolant for achieving superconductivity in materials employed
in superconducting devices. Superconductivity becomes the focal
point of the helium controversy since, in most instances, substitutes
can be found for the present and projected non-superconducting
applications of helium. Proponents of continued helium conserva-
tion, although not unconcerned with assuring a supply of helium for
non-superconducting applications, mainly fear that supplies will be
inadequate when practical superconducting devices, absolutely
dependent on helium cooling, become available for solving our en-
ergy, transportation, and computing needs.8 The opponents of a
reinstituted government helium purchase and storage program
question the wisdom of authorizing expenditures at this time, effec-
tively tying up millions of government dollars until the 21st century,
without any definite assurance that the stored helium will be
needed.9
HELIUM SUPPLIES AND DEMANDS
In order to properly compare the economic arguments against
helium storage with the scientific arguments that helium must be
preserved now for future superconducting applications, it is neces-
7. For a discussion of magnetic containment fusion see Rose, Controlled Nuclear Fusion:
Status and Outlook, 172 SCIENCE 797 (May 21, 1971); Post, Fusion Power, 197 SCIENrwIC
AMERICAN 73 (December 1957); Gough and Eastlund, The Prospects of Fusion Power, 224
Scisrriic AMERICAN 50 (February 1971).
The large magnetic field which can be generated using superconductors may be useable to
levitate trains, thereby making possible very high speed, low friction transportation. For a
discussion of superconductor magnetic field generation, see Sampson, Craig and Strongin,
Advances in Superconducting Magnets, 216 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 114 (March 1967).
With normal (non-superconducting) computer elements there are inherent limitations on
performance; it may be possible to overcome these limitations with superconducting ele-
ments. See Giordmaine, Solid State Electronics: Scientific Basis for Future Advances, 195
SCIENCE 1235 (March 18, 1977).
8. See, e.g., the 1978 National Academy of Sciences Report at 13-18.
9. See Lave, Should the Government be Helium's Future, Helium Study Committee,
supra note 2, at 41-43 app. II [hereinafter cited as Lave].
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sary to consider some of the basic quantitative facts. 0 For example,
worldwide consumption is roughly one BCF (billion cubic feet)" per
year, and the United States consumes 70% of that. Furthermore,
this nation produces all the helium it consumes, and in 1977 ex-
ported somewhat less than 0.2 BCF. It is doubtful that the rest of
the world produced much more than 0.2 BCF of helium last year. 2
The only practical means of extracting helium from a mixture of
gases is by cooling to a sufficiently low temperature that all compo-
nents except the helium liquefy, leaving a gaseous residue of almost
pure helium. In this fashion, all needed quantities of helium could
be extracted from the atmosphere, which contains a vast and essen-
tially inexhaustible supply. Unfortunately, the relatively low con-
centration of helium in the atmosphere (about 5 parts per million)
causes the extraction process to be expensive in terms of both energy
expended" and actual dollar costs." On the other hand, the concen-
tration of helium in the so called helium-rich natural gas fields is
much higher than the atmospheric levels. In fact, there are a few
wells in the United States with helium concentrations of almost ten
percent. This leads to the inescapable conclusion that atmospheric
extraction of helium is, and always will be, energetically and eco-
10. Sources for the various facts concerning helium supplies and the 1960 Helium Act are
listed in Interagency Helium Study, supra note 2, and in the Helium Study Committee, supra
note 2 at Executive Summary 1-22; Dimensions of the Helium Problem at 23-32; and the
contribution by Lipper, Past and Present Uses of Helium at 10-29 app. II.
11. By convention, a cubic foot of gas is understood to mean the mass of gas contained in
one cubic foot at atmospheric pressure and at a temperature of zero degrees Centigrade.
12. This suggests two obvious questions: What are the sources of helium presently being
consumed, and is there any special reason for the United States to be the major helium
producing nation? The answers are simple. The only known sources of helium are the atmos-
phere and some natural gas fields, and the gas fields in which helium concentrations are high
are located almost entirely in the Southwestern United States.
13. Various graphic phrasings of the costs of extracting helium from the atmosphere in
the amounts needed to meet merely present (not future) needs can be found in the literature.
For example, ERDA has concluded that the energy cost of producing one BCF per year of
helium from the atmosphere would require at least 50% of the annual output of the Alaska
pipeline. See Remarks of Leroy Culbertson, in Helium Study Committee, supra note 2, at 66
app. II.
14. Of course, if there were a market for the huge stocks of liquid oxygen and liquid
nitrogen produced during the cooling process, the dollar costs of extracting helium from the
atmosphere could be largely defrayed by the sale of those liquefied gasses. Unfortunately
extraction of the quantities of helium needed to satisfy current and projected requirements
would produce enormously greater volumes of liquid oxygen and nitrogen than the present
and projected demands for these products could possible absorb. See remarks of Francis,
Helium Study Committee, supra note 2, at 136 app. II.
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nomically expensive, whereas extraction of helium from helium-rich
natural gas is far less costly.
Since the United States contains the world's largest supply of
non-atmospheric helium," it is the only country in the position to
possibly produce and market helium at moderate costs. It has been
estimated that in the United States two-thirds of the helium is
contained in helium-rich natural gas fields." A pragmatic approach
to the appraisal of helium conservation policies requires reserves in
known helium-rich fields to be supplemented by estimates of the
helium content in natural gas fields not yet discovered. Although it
may be difficult to make estimates for the entire world, the amount
of helium remaining to be discovered can be accurately estimated
for the United States. According to the Bureau of Mines, United
States helium resources (including helium-lean and undiscovered
fields) total about 700 BCF.17 If the 100 BCF of helium contained
in known United States helium-rich fields were to remain extracta-
ble, and if the United States demand for helium were to continue
at its present level, then this nation could easily meet its own hel-
ium demands for at least 100 years. By including the estimated
helium supplies in helium-lean and undiscovered United States
fields, the period during which this nation could meet its helium
demands at costs significantly less than the cost of atmospheric
extraction might be extended by approximately 1,000 years. How-
ever, it is generally agreed that non-superconducting conventional
uses of helium will steadily increase during the next half century,
and this will reduce significantly the period during which the United
States can readily meet its own conventional helium demands. Ac-
celerated exhaustion of our natural gas helium supplies will ensue
15. This claim is not difficult to substantiate. If the term helium-rich is defined to denote
natural gas containing 0.3 percent or more helium, then the only known helium-rich natural
gas reserves outside the United States lie in Canada. The total helium in the Canadian
helium-rich fields is estimated to be 4.3 BCF, whereas the total helium remaining in the
known United States helium-rich fields is thought to be about 100 BCF. Moreover, extraction
from helium-lean fields would not vastly increase the total amount of helium potentially
extractable from natural gas without high extraction costs.
16. Nevertheless, the amount of helium in helium-lean natural gas wells outside of the
United States is far from negligible. For example, the Algerian natural gas field could yield
100 BCF of helium at an extraction cost two to three times greater than United States
extraction costs. See the remarks of Howland, Helium Study Committee, supra note 2, at
44, 45 app. II, and of Henrie supra note 2, at 130 app. II.
17. Henrie, Management of Helium Resources, Helium Study Committee, supra note 2,
at 129 app. II.
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if the hoped-for large scale applications of superconductivity be-
come practical in the 21st century. It is also important to realize
that the mere presence of helium in natural gas fields, whether
helium-rich or helium-poor, is of no consequence unless the helium
is extracted before the natural gas receives its primary
use-combustion to produce heat. During combustion the unex-
tracted helium gas component of the otherwise combustible natural
gas escapes into the atmosphere. Therefore, unless the helium pres-
ently contained in our natural gas fields is extracted and stored for
future needs before those fields are substantially depleted, it is
likely that the United States' helium demands in the major portion
of the 21st century will be dependent upon high-cost atmospheric
extraction. It is stressed, however, that this last conclusion does not
in and of itself justify current implementation of a government nat-
ural gas helium extraction and storage program. The arguments
favoring such a program (mainly the high likelihood of otherwise
having to rely on expensive atmosphere-extracted helium in the 21st
century) must be balanced against the economic arguments oppos-
ing the program.
THE HELIUM ACT STORAGE PROGRAM-LEGAL ISSUES
The foregoing discussion has laid the groundwork for an analysis
of the Helium Act Amendments of 1960 and the authorized helium
storage program, the abrupt termination of which by the Secretary
of the Interior spawned the present helium conservation contro-
versy.
Prior to 1960, the Bureau of Mines was essentially the sole produ-
cer and purveyor of helium in the United States pursuant to con-
gressionally granted authority under the Helium Acts of 1925 and
1937.18 Persuaded that the nation faced a shortage of relatively inex-
pensive helium, Congress in 1960 authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to make contracts for the acquisition, processing, transpor-
tation or conservation of helium for periods not exceeding twenty-
five years. 9 The Secretary was authorized to sell helium at prices
established by him which would adequately cover all costs, includ-
ing interest, within 25 years.20 Elsewhere, the 1960 Amendments
18. Helium Study Committee, supra note 2, at 19.
19. 50 U.S.C. § 167a (a)(2) (1970).
20. 50 U.S.C. § 167d (c) (1970).
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declared that it was in the national interest to foster and encourage
individual enterprise in the development and distribution of sup-
plies of helium while at the same time providing a sustained supply
of helium which would be sufficient to support essential government
activities.21
Pursuant to the Helium Act Amendments, the Secretary of the
Interior entered into contracts to purchase helium extracted by four
different companies from the pipeline natural gas they controlled. 2
Each contract was for twenty-two years, with the total dollar
amounts of helium to be purchased per year from the four suppliers
limited to $47.5 million. Presumably in reliance on these contracts,
the four companies built helium extraction plants; between 1962
and 1973 the Secretary purchased a total of 32 BCF of helium,
costing $385 million.23 Until used by the government, or sold to other
consumers under the Act's authority, helium was stored in the Bu-
reau of Mines storage system. To comply with the congressional
mandate that the purchase and storage program repay its costs
within twenty-five years,2 ' the Secretary in 1961 raised his selling
price of helium to $35 per MCF (thousand cubic feet) from a pre-
vious price of between $15 and $19 per MCF.25 The new price was
well above the $20-25 figure which private helium producers were
charging their customers.26
The Helium Act Amendments required government agencies to
purchase helium from the Secretary of the Interior," although his
selling price was above the market price. However, the govern-
ment's needs for helium did not grow as rapidly as had been antici-
pated in 19 60 ,2s and private consumers could purchase helium from
21. 50 U.S.C. § 167m (1970).
22. The contractors were Northern National Gas Co., (Northern Helex), limited to a
maximum of $9.5 million per year, at a price (in 1961) of $11.24 per thousand cubic feet
(MCF) of helium; Cities Service Helex, maximum sales $9.1 million per year, at $11.75 per
MCF; National Helium, maximum sales $15.2 million per year, at $11.78 per MCF; Phillips
Petroleum, maximum sales $13.7 million per year at $10.30 per MCF. Northern Natural Gas
Co. v. Grounds, 441 F.2d at 716-17.
23. 1 Interagency Helium Study, supra note 2, at 4; and 2 Interagency Helium Study,
supra note 2, at 5.
24. See note 19 supra.
25. 2 Interagency Helium Study, supra note 2, at 5; Helium Study Committee, supra note
2, at 127 app. II.
26. Id. at 29; Ashland Oil v. Phillips Petroleum, 364 F. Supp. 6, 9 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
27. 50 U.S.C. § 167d (a) (1970).
28. 2 Interagency Helium Study, supra note 2, at 26.
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private producers at a much lower price. 9 Consequently, the pur-
chase and storage program was $211 million in debt by 19700 with
little prospect of being able to liquidate this debt by 1985 as re-
quired by the Act. Moreover, the amount of stored helium at the end
of 1970 was 100 times the Bureau of Mines' total helium sales to
government and private consumers during fiscal year 1970.1' There-
fore, the Secretary of the Interior, asserting that continuation of the
helium purchases by the government was no longer necessary to
provide a sustained supply of helium sufficient to provide for essen-
tial government activities, unilaterally terminated the aforemen-
tioned four contracts in January, 1971.32 Three of the four suppliers
sued to enjoin termination of the purchases. After considerable
litigation the power of the Secretary to terminate the contracts was
29. In an attempt to keep the Government's helium sales from dropping, the Secretary
of the Interior published regulations (33 Fed. Reg. 15478 (1968)) forbidding contractors of
government agencies from purchasing helium from any source but the Secretary. However,
these regulations were struck down as exceeding his Congressionally authorized powers. Air
Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
30. 2 Interagency Helium Study, supra note 2, at 40.
31. Id. at 28.
32. The Secretary acted under a termination clause in the contracts which stated: "Buyer
may . . . terminate this contract at any time if . . . in the opinion of the Secretary of the
Interior . . . a substantial diminution in helium requirements . . . would make the . . .
continued purchase of helium-gas . . . unnecessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act."
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 653 (10th Cir. 1971).
33. The plaintiffs claimed that the Secretary of the Interior could not terminate the
contract without filing an environmental impact statement as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970), because the helium-if
not extracted from natural gas-would be vented into the atmosphere with environmental
consequences. The court upheld this view, and issued an injunction preventing the Secretary
from terminating the contract until he had complied with the NEPA requirements. National
Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971). After some time the Secretary did
file an environmental impact statement, and restated his intent to terminate the contracts
(as of April 4, 1973). Nevertheless, the district court refused to dissolve the previous injunc-
tion, on the grounds that the environmental impact statement was inadequate, and that
therefore the Secretary could not have taken the "hard look" at the possible environmental
impacts of his action which NEPA requires. The district court also ruled that the Secretary's
failure to hold public hearings before terminating the contracts constituted an abuse of
discretion. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 361 F. Supp. 78 (D.C. Kans. 1973). However,
the court of appeals reversed and ordered an end to the injunction, stating that under a rule
of reason standard the Secretary had fulfilled the only requirement NEPA imposed upon him,
namely to file and to consider an impact statement furnishing a reasonable discussion of
relevant subject matter, in objective good faith compliance with the demands of NEPA.
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993.
The environmental impact statement which is the subject of these decisions is contained in
note 2 supra.
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upheld,34 but the ruling that the Secretary did not abuse his discre-
tion in terminating the contracts did not necessarily relieve the
government of liability for material breach of contract. 5 The Court
of Claims thus far has refused to decide if the termination of the
contracts was a material breach. 3
The legislative history of the 1960 Helium Act Amendments
clearly indicates that the major purpose of the Act was to ensure a
supply of helium for the essential government activities of agencies
such as the Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission,
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.3 7 The gov-
ernment had not intended to conserve helium for the new technolo-
gies of the 21st century, and lost interest in the helium purchase
program when the Federal agencies' helium demands began to fall
far short of the amounts originally envisaged.38 From this viewpoint,
the Secretary of the Interior's termination of the program was con-
sistent with congressional intent.
On the other hand, if it could be determined that helium conser-
vation for 21st century needs is in the long-term national interest,
then the Interior Department should be doing its best to foster hel-
34. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973).
35. During the years preceding 1969, Congress failed to appropriate enough money to
make up for the continuing deficits caused by the government's failure to sell as much helium
as originally anticipated, although it was obligated to purchase helium at the rates originally
contracted for in 1961. Consequently the government failed to make full payments during
1969, and paid nothing during 1970. The court of claims has agreed that this failure to make
payments, before giving any notice that the contract was being terminated, constituted a
material breach of contract by the Secretary. Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d
546 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
36. The litigation on whether the contract termination was a material breach has been
tangled by the government's previous failure to make payments, see note 34 supra, and by
the companies' insistence on continuing to furnish helium although the Secretary no longer
wanted the helium and was trying to terminate the contract. This insistence could be re-
garded as having lost the companies their rights under the government's earlier material
breach of failure to make payments. Cities Service Helex v. United States, 543 F.2d 1306 (Ct.
Cl. 1976); Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 707 (Ct. Cl. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 866; Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d 546 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
37. 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3595. The belief that Congress was largely moti-
vated by fear of a shortage of helium for defense needs (including space activities) is rein-
forced by the fact that the Helium Act Amendments of 1960, like earlier Helium Acts, made
explicit references to defense needs and were codified under Title 50, "War and National
Defense." See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 167b and 167c (1970). The 1960 Act revised and repealed
the former 50 U.S.C. §§ 161-166.
38. The mere fact that the Secretary of the Interior was supposed to cover the costs of
the program via helium sales shows that helium conservation for the distant future was not
a primary Congressional intent. See note 19 supra.
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ium conservation by private industry. This would be proper even if
the executive branch concluded that continued helium purchases by
the government were inconsistent with the original narrow congres-
sional mandate. An approach of this sort to the helium conservation
problem would be in accord with Lave's views concerning the gov-
ernment's proper role39 and, if it succeeded in preventing wasteful
loss of helium to the atmosphere as our natural gas is combusted,
would satisfy the critics of present policy. As a matter of fact, the
Interior Department has adopted just such an approach. Since 1975,
the government has instituted a program whereby it will store hel-
ium for private firms at low storage and redelivery charges. As
added incentives, the helium can be redelivered in a purified form
and storage charges are deferred until redelivery.1° Nevertheless,
most of the helium being taken out of the earth in natural gas every
year continues to be released to the atmosphere without extraction
and, therefore, is wasted."
The continued waste of helium compels one to conclude that the
government's present approach to encouraging helium conservation
by private industry cannot realistically be termed successful. One
of the former helium suppliers finds the government's storage pro-
gram so unattractive, despite the reduced storage rates and other
inducements, 2 that it deliberately has rejected storing the helium
it is extracting from natural gas in favor of venting this extracted
helium into the atmosphere . 3 This is by no means an imprudent
business judgment in light of the present circumstances, which in-
clude a line of cases where resolution might heavily penalize private
companies and the government for undertaking helium storage.
An examination of precedents which lead to this conclusion might
be enlightening. Before 1960, neither the landowners who leased the
oil and gas rights to the producers, nor the producers who sold the
gas to the pipeline companies, cared that natural gas contains hel-
ium. After the Interior Department signed its contracts with pipe-
39. See Lave, supra note 9.
40. 1 Interagency Helium Study, supra note 2, at 11. The rates for accepting, storing and
redelivering the gas, per thousand cubic feet, were respectively 4 cents, 4 cents, and 22 cents;
the corresponding former rates were 44 cents, 44 cents, and 44 cents respectively. See Ander-
son, supra note 2.
41. 1 Interagency Helium Study, supra note 2, at 11.
42. Id.
43. See 1 Interagency Helium Report, supra note 2, at 60; and Helium Study Committee,
supra note 2, at 28. See also note 58 infra.
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line companies to purchase helium, however, the landowners sued
the producers and the producers sued the pipeline companies to
recover lost income. The property owners complained that although
they had given the producers oil and gas leases, the term "gas" was
intended to include combustible gas only, and not inert helium.
Thus, the property owners contended, the producers had never re-
ceived title to the helium and could not legally convey the helium
to the pipeline companies." The producers argued that they indeed
had received title to the helium, but nevertheless echoed the land-
owners by complaining that the gas sales contracts the producers
had with the pipeline companies were intended to include combusti-
ble gas only. On an unjust enrichment theory, the producers
claimed they were entitled to compensation for the reasonable value
of the helium the pipeline companies had been extracting and sell-
ing to the detriment of the producers. 5 The pipeline companies
disclaimed any liability to the producers arguing instead that the
producers had contracted to deliver the gas stream in its entirety."
The court in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds held that the
leases had been intended to include helium, meaning the producers
had received title to the helium from the landowners. 7 Furthermore,
the price for delivered gas quoted in the producers' sales contract
with the pipeline companies could not have been intended to in-
clude the value of the helium because under the Natural Gas Act,"
the price was regulated by the Federal Power Commission, which
is concerned only with the value of the natural gas as a fuel." Fi-
44. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 441 F.2d at 710-15.
45. Id. at 715-20.
46. Id. at 720-22.
47. The court's language was, "We conclude that, absent specific reservations, the grant
of gas by the lease covered all components of the gas, including helium." Id. at 715.
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1970).
49. The court's reasoning in reaching this holding merits quotation:
The Helex companies insist that the equities favor them. They say that they built
the multi-million dollar extraction plants and assumed the necessary risks. They
charge that the lessee-producers stood idly by while the risks were taken, the money
invested, and the work done by others. In support of the principle that equity does not
take from those who earn it and reward those who silently stand aside and await the
success of the enterprise, they cite the refreshing authority found in the folk-tale of
the Little Red Hen.
At this point the court adds a footnote explaining the Little Red Hen's thesis, "You remember
that I planted the wheat, and cut it, I carried it to mill, I made the bread and baked it-and
now all of you would help me eat it! No, indeed." The court then goes on to distinguish and
reject the Little Red Hen's precedent:
1978-79
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nally, the court ordered the pipeline companies to recompense the
producers for the value of the helium delivered. The producers in
turn were to pay the landowners royalties on proceeds received from
the helium gas sales to the pipeline companies.0 The court refrained
from determining the value of the helium delivered and the case was
remanded to the district court for determination of this value.5'
The Supreme Court declined to review the case52 and it stands as
law in the 10th Circuit. Thereafter, different courts have arrived at
widely differing valuations of the helium delivered to the pipeline
operators. A Kansas district court, after examining "comparable
sales", ruled that the market value of the commingled, unextracted
helium at the point of delivery to the pipeline companies was 60 to
70 cents per MCF.5 3 Apparently this court felt that before extraction
by the pipeline companies the helium was worth very little in com-
parison to its purified market value of $20-$25 per MCF. On the
other hand, an Oklahoma district court valued the helium in the
range of $12 to $17 per MCF, after subtracting the extraction costs
from the established market price of purified helium," evidently
feeling that the extraction process had added much less value to the
commingled helium than the Kansas court thought. The Oklahoma
court's "work-back" method of valuing the unextracted helium was
affirmed by the 10th Circuit, which said the comparable sales
method used by the Kansas district court was inapplicable.55
The activities of the Little Red Hen were not those of a public utility, and neither
the product nor the ingredients thereof were subject to governmental rate regulation.
Therein lies the difference. In our opinion private contract law and the principles
applicable thereto are not controlling. This makes it unnecessary for us to delve into
the many cases and texts bearing on -the respective rights of parties to private con-
tracts.
441 F.2d at 718-23.
50. Id. at 723.
51. Id.
52. In another opinion, the Supreme Court appeared to agree with the Grounds holding
that natural gas prices regulated under the Natural Gas Act should not be regarded as
including payment for the helium in the gas. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, 415 U.S. 125
(1974).
53. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 393 F. Supp. 949, 984 (D.C. Kan 1974).
54. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum, 364 F. Supp. 6 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
55. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum, 554 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 921 (1977). The court wrote, "It is obvious that the comparable sales-currently
market price is by far the preferable method when it can be used. However, it cannot be
used when the elements necessary for its proper application are lacking. The trial court thus
had to resort to a work-back method or price less costs of beneficiation. This was a less
desirable method but perfectly valid." Id. at 387. Despite this language, the court did not
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To date, no other decisions on the helium valuation issue have
been reported, although a number of cases dealing with the issue are
pending.56 The 10th Circuit did remand Ashland Oil vs. Phillips
Petroleum57 to the Oklahoma district court to re-examine, inter alia,
the starting value from which extraction costs are to be subtracted.
The Oklahoma court has not yet reached a decision, but it is un-
likely that its recomputed work-back value of the commingled hel-
ium will be much less than the $12 to $17 per MCF range found
previously.
This protracted litigation, especially the Ashland results, ex-
plains the pipeline companies' cool reception toward the govern-
ment's present helium storage program despite the incentives of-
fered to private industry. The pipeline companies have already in-
curred a $96 million liability, even considering their apparently lim-
ited liability of $3 per MCF,55 for participating in the government's
1962-1973 storage program. The penalty is further compounded by
the anticipated length of time helium may have to be stored before
it is again in high demand. Thus, it is quite understandable that
pipeline companies are hesitant to undertake further helium stor-
age. Since the storage now would no longer be under the government
purchase contracts and their indemnification clause, a potential full
liability to the producers $12 to $17 per MCF is possible. Although
not all the pipeline companies have drawn the same conclusion, at
least one company apparently feels it must vent the extracted hel-
ium to avoid the potential liability for unjustifiably enriching itself
explicitly overrule the Kansas District Court's valuation of the helium in Grounds, although
Kansas, like Oklahoma, is in the Tenth Circuit.
56. Amoco Production Co. v. Phillips Petroleum (No. 44, 864, 108th Judicial District
Court, Texas); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum (No. C-75-818, D.C. Tulsa County,
Okla.); Texas, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum (No. C-75-90, D.C. Tulsa County, Okla.). Crounds
is still on appeal to the Tenth Circuit. See note 52 supra. See also 2 Interagency Flelium
Study, supra note 2, at 45-49, and the Secretary of the Interior, Report to the Congress on
Matters Contained in the Helium Act, Fiscal Year 1976 6-10 (Oct. 1976) [hereinafter cited
as Report].
57. See note 54 supra.
58. The Report, supra note 56, at 6, states "The Government is interested in the outcome
of the litigation because the four helium purchase contracts it has entered into contain
provisions under which the United States may be required to indemnify the helium extraction
companies if the latter are required to pay the lessee-producers more than about $3 per
thousand cubic feet of helium." The exact text of the indemnification clause is given in
Ashland Oil v. Phillips, 364 F. Supp. 6, 8 (N.D. Okla. 1973). The $96 million liability figure
equals the value, at $3 per MCF of the 32 BCF of helium sold to the government during the
period 1962-1973. See note 22 supra.
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with the helium received from the producers.59 Statements by pipe-
line company representatives detailing the disincentives they dis-
cern in the present helium storage program can be found in the
literature. 0
RECENT HELIUM CONSERVATION POLICY PROPOSALS
As stressed earlier, it may be argued that the socio-economic costs
of tying up millions of dollars in helium storage are unwarranted
when balanced against the lack of definite assurance that the stored
helium will be needed in the 21st century. The proposition, although
not indefensible, appears to have few adherents. For example, Lave
argues mainly against a government helium storage program6" and
is not unwilling to have private industry invest in helium storage,
should it so desire. 2 Cities Services, while venting its already ex-
tracted helium, agrees the originally authorized helium storage pro-
gram "has been a wonderful thing" aifd feels it is regrettable that
the program was stopped. 3 Although unwilling to continue storing
government owned helium, the government's announced and imple-
mented policy since 1975 has been to encourage helium storage by
private industry in government facilities. However, a recent defense
of the government's present policy by Dr. Frank Press, Director of
the White House Office of Scientific and Technology Policy, does
employ language suggesting disagreement with the proposition that
helium storage at this time is warranted. The only specific conclu-
sion Dr. Press is willing to draw is, "While insufficient analysis has
yet been done on this issue, the weight of evidence currently avail-
59. Of the four original contractors with the government, Northern Helex took advantage
of the Government's new private industry helium storage incentive program shortly after it
was announced in 1975. Phillips Petroleum shut down one of its two extraction plants, but
since December 1977 has been storing helium from its other extraction plant, at a rate of
about 0.4 BCF per year. Cities Service continues to vent about 0.6 BCF of extracted helium
per year. National Helium has shut down. Helium Study Committee, supra note 2, at 28; 2
Interagency Helium Report, supra note 2, at 21.
60. See Comments of Leroy Culbertson, Helium Study Committee, supra note 2, at 65
app. 11; and George C. Vaughan, id. at 68.
61. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
62. In fact, Lave has stated explicitly: "I would personally be happy to put my own funds
in helium storage. Helium is a good investment. Given all of the wild uncertainties with
respect to future government regulation and so on, it still would earn a handsome rate of
return." Helium Study Committee, supra note 2, at 72 app. II.
63. Remarks of George C. Vaughan, supra note 60.
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able would not suggest to me the need to initiate a government
stockpile program now.""
Because Dr. Press is a very distinguished scientist as well as an
important government spokesman, his views must be given great
weight. Nonetheless, his arguments and his conclusions are rejected
by the overwhelming majority of this nation's physical scientists,
who are convinced that current increased helium storage now by
some agency is warranted, and in fact essential, despite the uncer-
tainties inherent in predicting helium requirements and costs into
the future. As the physical scientists perceive it, if private industry
refuses or is unable to prevent the release into the atmosphere of the
natural gas helium, then the government must do the preventing.
Recent statements on helium conservation by several of our most
distinguished scientific organizations are uncompromising in their
affirmations that as much helium as possible must be stored now
to ensure its availability in-the future. In particular, the American
Physical Society believes that the reasons for the original conserva-
tion program remain valid and supports the continuation of such a
program.A5 The American Chemical Society has specifically urged
Congress to pass emergency legislation." In addition, the National
Academy of Sciences, this nation's most prestigious scientific organ-
ization, has urged the government to recommence the storage of
government owned helium and to prevent the venting of already
extracted helium. 67
The advocates of a program to increase helium storage have of-
fered a variety of proposals to accomplish this goal. Such proposals
generally call on the government to accept the major responsibility
for helium storage. Proposals for renewed storage of government
owned helium tend to be coupled with specific provisions to encour-
age industry to store helium. Proposals of this type include:
1. Improved tax treatment for stored helium, 8
64. Letter from Dr. Frank Press to Dr. Phillip Handler (September 26, 1977).
65. American Physical Society Panel on Public Affairs Statement on Helium
Conservation, 31 PHmslcs TODAY 24 (April 1978).
66. 56 CEMICAL AND ENGIMENG NEws 4 (February 6, 1978).
67. Helium Study Committee, supra note 2, at 3.
68. Id. at 2. Such improved tax treatment might include, e.g., exempting stored helium
from state and local ad valorem taxes or (if such exemption is not constitutional) federal tax
credits against such state and local taxes.
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2. Permitting Federal agencies to obtain their helium from
private industry, 9
3. Increasing to at least 50 years the government commitment
to store privately owned helium in government storage facili-
ties,70
4. Institution of a "helium degradation penalty" which would
tax or fine pipeline companies who distribute helium-rich nat-
ural gas to consumers for combustion without arranging for
helium extraction, and which would similarly penalize helium
extractors who vent already extracted helium rather than stor-
ing it or selling it for non-wasteful use.7
Legislation reinstituting the government's helium purchase and
storage program, and incorporating some of private industry storage
incentives, has been introduced in the Senate.72 More importantly,
this proposed legislation embodies a congressional intent to con-
serve helium for future technology, thereby remedying the deficien-
cies of the 1960 Helium Act Amendments which permitted the Sec-
retary of the Interior to unilaterally cancel the government's helium
purchase contracts. 7
Evidently the author of this legislation, who is not a physical
scientist and therefore cannot automatically be accused of down-
playing economic realities in favor of technological hopes, also re-
jects Lave's thesis that helium storage should be solely the responsi-
bility and province of private industry. Indeed, on balance this
rejection does seem reasonable. If current helium storage is a good
investment for industry because comparatively inexpensive helium
will be essential for 21st century technology, then it appears to be
excessively doctrinaire to insist the government should not be stor-
ing this 21st century requisite.
OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS
Regrettably, one must conclude that his survey amounts to an
indictment of our nation's political, economic and legal priorities.
69. Id. at 140 app. II.
70. Letter from Professor M. Tinkham to Dr. Phillip Handler (February 27, 1978).
71. Id. See also Helium Study Committee, supra note 2, at 2.
72. Kansas Senator Pearson on September 19, 1977, introduced S. 2109, titled the
"National Helium Conservation Policy Act." The bill was referred to the Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources.
73. See note 33 supra.
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Helium is a unique substance, possessing remarkable properties. It
happens to be highly concentrated-and thus comparatively
cheaply extractable-only in some United States natural gas fields.
Even if no useful applications of helium were presently foreseeable,
one would expect a modern civilized nation to prudently conserve
such a resource, not merely out of deference to nature's bounty, but
also because our scientific and technological experience has amply
demonstrated the likelihood of finding future uses for presently un-
usable materials. Moreover, useful applications are presently fore-
seeable, though perhaps not wholly certain. Yet this potential util-
ity, making helium more valuable today than it otherwise would be,
appears to have diminished rather than increased the prospects for
storing helium against the inevitable day when our natural gas
fields will become depleted. Because Congress thought helium
would be valuable, it saddled the 1960 helium purchase and storage
program with the requirement that the program pay for itself within
twenty-five years. The legal morass created by the 1960 program has
made both the government and the helium extractors uncertain of
their past liability for helium received and fearful that storing hel-
ium in the future will only increase chances for further potential
liability.7 The fact that helium is subject to ad valorem taxes when
stored further reduces private industry's incentive to store it, espe-
cially in view of the fact that these taxes might have to be paid well
into the 21st century.
Proposed bill S. 2109 eliminates the requirement that the govern-
ment's helium storage program pay interest," and possesses other
features which remedy the deficiencies of the 1960 Act7" and de-
crease the likelihood of wastage. Yet the bill calls for considerably
smaller helium purchase expenditures than authorized under the
1960 Act.77 Even at the originally contracted helium purchase
prices, the $20 million per year expenditure called for would store
less than 2 BCF per year, an amount much smaller than the 7 BCF
74. See text and discussion accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
75. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
76. In particular, S. 2109 permits Federal agencies to purchase helium from private sup-
pliers, and simultaneously eliminates the 1960 Helium Act requirement that the helium
conservation program costs be self-liquidating. See notes 19 & 23 and accompanying text
supra.
77. The bill limits helium purchase expenditures to an average of $20 million per year for
the next 12 years; $20 million is less than half the annual expenditures the 1960 Act author-
ized for 22 years. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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per year which leaves the ground in helium-rich natural gas.78 Yet
even this proposal appears to have little chance of passage in the
near future. The bill has been tied up in the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, and no congressman has even intro-
duced a corresponding helium storage bill in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Moreover, the executive branch continues to adhere to
Dr. Press' conclusion that at this time there is no need to initiate a
government storage program.79
The difficulties inherent in effectuating sound environmental
conservation policies are systemic; congressmen who vote now for
environmental policies benefiting future generations have to find
the funds from taxes imposed on their present constituents, not
from future beneficiaries of such environmental laws. Corporate
executives who invest funds now for even assured huge profits too
far in the future may find themselves facing angry shareholders who
want more dividends today. Judges are required by our laws to make
property settlements now without regard to the likely harmful ef-
fects on the technologies of future generations. The helium conser-
vation controversy is but one example, albeit a remarkably legally
tangled one, of those policy issues whose resolution today, by
today's politicians and judges, will more vitally affect future genera-
tions than today's contending parties.10
78. One would expect the suppliers to demand considerably higher prices today, in view
of the inflation since 1961.
79. 1 Interagency Helium Study, supra note 2, at 1. The actual language used in this
study, prepared by representatives of the Defense, Interior and Energy Departments, together
with a representative of NASA, was, "At least in the short term, it is unsound for the Federal
Government to buy helium for storage."
80. One suggestion for dealing with policy issues involving highly technical matters, the
so-called Science Court proposal, was the subject of an educational program, Curbing Igno-
rance and Arrogance: The Science Court Proposal and Alternatives, presented at the Ameri-
can Bar Association, August 1978, New York centennial meeting by its section of Science and
Technology. The section expects to publish the talks given in this program.
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